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E f f i c i e n c y i n P e r e g u l a t e d E l e c t r i c i t y 
M a r k e t s ? O f f e r C o s t M i n i m i z a t i o n v s . 
P a y m e n t C o s t M i n i m i z a t i o n A u c t i o n 
Rimvydas Baltadounis, University of Connecticut, USA 
A payment cost minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. In the electricity industry, where even small changes in $/MW are worth tens of millions of dollars, it is highly important that policy makers 
have a good understanding of the tradeoffs and impacts of new institutional 
rules. In this paper we examine efficiency performance of the proposed PCM 
auction in contrast with the offer cost minimization (OCM) auction currently 
used by most independent system operators (ISOs) in the United States. For 
most of the analysis we concentrate on production efficiency, which is attained 
when a product is supplied to the market by the suppliers that have the smallest 
average total cost (ATC). An electricity market is efficient if there is no 
generator that could produce electricity cheaper than the chosen generators do. 
Production efficiency is desired because 1) it guarantees that market output is 
produced using the least-cost combination of inputs, thus resources are not 
wasted, 2) it also rewards the low-cost suppliers and provides the incentives to 
search for production techniques with even lower costs. 
Deregulated U.S. wholesale electricity markets (e.g. the day-ahead, hour-
ahead, and real-time markets) operated by ISOs generally adopt an auction 
mechanism to select generation offers and demand bids for energy and 
ancillary services. In the day-ahead energy markets, all selected suppliers are 
paid at a uniform market clearing price (MCP), usually the price of the most 
expensive selected offer. Currently, most ISOs adopt the OCM auction by 
using the traditional unit commitment approach1. It has been pointed out by 
Yan and Stem (2002) that this auction does not ensure the lowest procurement 
costs of electricity to consumers for a given set of offers. This motivated Luh et 
1
 For a bibliographical survey on the unit commitment problem see Padhy (2004). 
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al (2005a) to develop a market clearing algorithm that rninimizes actual 
procurement costs. They showedthat the new method is viable, and can lead to 
significant savings for consumers for the given set of offers since it considers 
the impact of MCPs on total payment costs while OCM does not. Knoblauch 
(2005) pointed out that if suppliers tailor their offers to the type of auction they 
face! it is no longer obvious that the PCM algorithm will generate lower 
procurement costs. A game theoretic approach was used to analyze how the 
new auction affects market participant behaviors. The results demonstrated that 
adding competing suppliers increases the advantage of the new method over 
the traditional with respect to procurement costs even when strategic behavior 
is taken into account. 
Proponents of the OCM auction claim that if offer prices represent true 
production costs, then this mechanism maximizes total producer and consumer 
surplus, or in other words, achieves allocative efficiency (Arroyo & Conejo 
2002, Alonso et al. 1999). However, the 2000-01 California energy crisis 
shows us that offers frequently have nothing to do with the actual cost of 
generation units and can vary greatly even among units with similar costs 
(Stern 2001). In our attempt to capture strategic behavior of market 
participants, we use a game theoretic approach to investigate production 
efficiency performance of two auctions. Following the above mentioned 
studies, we assume that market demand is given, i.e. perfectly inelastic, and 
therefore demand bids are not considered for the most of the paper. This 
assumption implies that our production efficiency analysis is equivalent to the 
allocative efficiency analysis. With that said, if market demand is not perfectly 
inelastic, this generalization can not be made. However, at the end of this 
paper, we look at allocative efficiency performance of two auctions with 
downward sloping market demand curve as well. 
In the day-ahead energy markets, all generating units submit their offers 
for every hour. Offer information includes a set of energy blocks and their 
corresponding prices. A generator may also declare technical constraints and a 
start-up price, which is paid to the generator if the offer is selected. The later 
feature of offers distinguishes wholesale electricity auctions from other 
quantity-price bid auctions. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate allocative 
efficiency properties of the OCM and the PCM algorithms in the context of 
electricity market design. We demonstrate in this paper that the OCM approach 
does not necessarily lead to the maximum of total surplus for market 
participants. This is true even if offer prices reflect true production costs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a 
motivating example from Yan and Stern (2002) is used to demonstrate the 
difference between the OCM and the PCM auctions and to stress the need to 
consider strategic behavior as we compare the two. In Section- III, using 
Knoblauch's (2005) game theoretic model, we present a surprising case where 
the OCM outcome is less efficient than, the PCM one if strategic behavior is 
taken into account. Section IV demonstrates that in a simple Two-Supplier 
Auction Model, which better describes more concentrated markets, both 
formulations can generate production inefficient outcomes. Competition 
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impacts on production efficiency are analyzed in Section V. The results suggest 
that as competition in the market increases, a market designer will likely face a 
tradeoff between two objectives: to minimize procurement cost of electricity 
and to seek production efficient allocations. In Section VI, Yan and Stern's 
example is extended to include the demand side of the market. We show the 
case where the PCM auction outperforms the OCM auction on allocative 
efficiency even if offer prices reflect true production costs. Conclusions are 
drawn in Section VII. 
Electricity Auction with Strategic Behavior. Example 1 
In this section, a simple example from Yan and Stem (2002) is used to 
highlight the differences between the OCM and the PCM.1 The authors take 
offers as given and do not account that generators might tailor their offers to 
the type of auction they face. We demonstrate how the outcomes from the 
auctions might change if strategic behavior is considered. 
Assume a power system for one hour with four units and perfectly inelastic 
system demand of 100MW. The costs and characteristics of the four units are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Costs and Characteristics of Four Units 
Capacity (MW) Energy Price ($/MW) Start-up Cost ($) 
Unit A 45 10 0 
UnitB 45 20 0 
UnitC 50 100 20 
UnitD 80 30 2,000 
Let's say for now that all generators submit offers that reflect their true 
production costs. The OCM algorithm selects offers so as to minimize total 
offered cost calculated from submitted energy prices and start-up costs. 
However, all suppliers are paid the MCP, i.e. the highest accepted energy price, 
for their supplied electricity. The PCM algorithm assigns contracts in order to 
minimize the actual final payment which is based on the MCP. It is important 
to note that in both auctions, actual payment is made at MCP. The solutions for 
the OCM and the PCM formulations are provided respectively in Tables 2 and 
3. 
1
 For mathematical formulation of two auctions see Luh et al. (2005a). 
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Table 2 Optimal Solution for the OCM Auction 
Unit Commitment PaytheMCP = $100/MW 
Energy 
* Schedule 
Unit 
A 
Unit 
B 
Unit 
C 
Unit 
D 
Total 
Table 3. 
Unit A 
UnitB 
Unite 
UnitD 
Total 
MW) 
45 
45 
10 
0 
100 
Energy 
Cost (S) 
450 
900 
1,000 
0 
2,350 
Start-up Sub-Total 
Cost ($) 
Optimal Solution for 
Energy 
Schedule 
0 
0 
20 
0 
20 
($) 
450 
900 
1,020 
0 
2,370 
the PCM Auction 
Unit Commitment 
inergy 
(MW) Cost ($) 
45 
45 
0 
10 
100 
450 
900 
0 
300 
1,650 
Start-up 
Cost (S) 
0 
0 
0 
2,000 
2,000 
Sub-
Totat 
($) 
450 
900 
0 
2,300 
3,650 
Energy 
Cost ($) 
4,500 
4,500 
1,000 
0 
10,000 
Start-up 
Cost ($) 
0 
0 
20 
0 
20 
Sub-
Total ($) 
4,500 
4,500 
1,020 
0 
10,020 
PaytheMCP = $30/MW 
Energy 
Cost ($) 
1,350 
1,350 
0 
300 
3,000 
Start-up 
Cost ($) 
0 
0 
0 
2,000 
2,000 
Sub-
Total 
(5) 
1,3 
50 
1,3 
50 
0 
2,3 
00 
5,0 
00 
These two methods produce different unit schedules with a significant 
impact on cost. The OCM contract allocation results in a $100.2/MW final 
price to consumers and a $23.7/MW average generation cost; the PCM results 
in S50/MW and $36.5/MW respectively. This example suggests that there 
might be a tradeoff between lower procurement costs of electricity and 
production efficiency. However, a question here is whether the offer strategies 
to bid .true generation costs correspond to Nash equilibria. Can any supplier 
benefit from changing their offer strategies unilaterally? Generators could 
restrict their generation output, change the energy cost ancVor start-up cost. 
ISOs usually demand an explanation if generators change their start-up costs or 
generation capacity, so strategic behavior is somewhat limited in these 
activities, Therefore, in this paper, we consider only energy cost offer 
strategies. 
Assume that market participants have perfect information about electricity 
production costs in the various types of generator units. In both auctions, A and 
B sell their Ml capacity and earn profit since the MCP price is higher than 
their energy cost. They cannot benefit from changing their offers. By doing so, 
they might risk some or all of their profits. D is a marginal generator in the 
PCM allocation and earns no economic profit. D could offer higher energy cost 
and still be selected for 10MW of generation. It is in the interest of D to 
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slightly underbid the total payment of $10,020 when C is selected. If D offers 
S80/MW, the total payment is $10,000 (<$10,020) and its economic profit is 
$500. C cannot benefit by changing its offer, since bidding below its costs 
would result in economic loss. On the other hand, C is a marginal generator 
with zero economic profit in the OCM allocation. It is in the interest of C to 
slightly underbid the total offer cost of $3,650 when D is selected. If C offers 
$227/MW, the total offer cost is $3,620 (<$3,650) and its economic profit is 
$1,270. D cannot improve its payoff in this case. Note that the final payment to 
consumers amounts to $22,720. Do these new sets of offer strategies 
correspond to Nash equilibria? The answer is closer to yes. 
In this particular example, the cost impact of two auctions is even higher if 
we account for strategic tjehavior. The OCM contract allocation results in a 
$227.2/MW final price to consumers and a $23.7/MW average generation cost; 
the PCM results in $100/MW and $36.5/MW respectively. In this case, 
switching from the OCM to the PCM auction would cause an increase of 
S12.8/MW in average production costs and a reduction of $127/MW in 
consumer price of electricity. It has to be noted that consumer savings here are 
at the expense of smaller generator profits and an increase in average 
production costs are at the expense of allocative efficiency. This paper explores 
a tradeoff between lower procurement costs and production efficiency again 
later. In Section VI, we extend this example by including demand bids and 
demonstrate that lower consumer prices from PCM does not necessarily lead to 
a loss in allocative efficiency. 
This simple example underscores the importance of considering strategic 
behavior when evaluating the performance of different power market 
institutions. It also suggests that market supervisors should keep a sharp eye on 
the marginal generators if market behavior becomes a concern. In the next 
section, we present a surprising case where the OCM outcome is less 
production efficient than the PCM if strategic behavior is taken into account. 
Can an OCM Allocation Be Less Production Efficient than a PCM? 
Example 2 
In a one-person game, Knoblauch (2005) shows that, counterintuitiveiy, 
the PCM generates higher procurement costs than the OCM. We present a 
similarly surprising case where,the OCM is less production efficient than the 
PCM. One would expect low-cost generators to underbid high-cost generators 
in order to be selected by the OCM auction. Especially because high-cost 
suppliers would most likely be setting the MCP and economic profits would be 
earned. 
Consider an electricity market for one hour with two generators. Supplier 1 
has start-up cost zero and energy cost $25/MW. He can supply 0 ,1 or 2MW of 
energy. Supplier 1 has two strategies, offer low Oj(l)- Oi(2)=$25 and offer 
high Oh(l)= Oh(2)=$40. Supplier 2 has start-up cost $20 and energy cost 
$10/MW. She can supply 1MW of energy and always submits her true 
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generation cost structure. The demand is inelastic and equal to 2MW. Notice 
that Supplier 1 has lower average total cost than Supplier 2, therefore he is 
relatively more efficient. An allocation of contracts would be production 
inefficient if Supplier 2 generated electricity while Supplier 1 was idle. 
Game 1; The OCM Auction 
The ISO calculates the minimum of the offered cost of buying 1MW 
from each supplier and the offered cost of buying 2MW from Supplier 1. 
If Supplier 1 submits O;, the ISO calculates offered cost as 
Min{20+10+25,2(25)}=2(25)=50 and Supplier 1 's payoff is 50-2*25=0. 
If Supplier 1 submits Oh, the ISO calculates offered cost as 
Min{20+10+40, 2(40)}= 20+10+40=70 and Supplier l ' s payoff is 40-
25=15. 
Therefore, in equilibrium Supplier 1 offers high, the MCP is S40/MW and 
the actual procurement cost is $100. Notice, that this allocation is not 
production efficient, since Supplier 2, with relatively higher average total cost, 
is serving 1MW, while Supplier 1, with relatively lower average total cost, is 
idle. 
Game 2: The PCM Auction 
The ISO calculates the minimum of the procurement cost of buying 1MW 
from each supplier and the procurement cost of buying 2MW from Supplier 1. 
If Supplier 1 submits Ou the ISO calculates procurement cost as 
Min{20+2max{10,25}, 2(25)}=2(25)=50 and Supplier l ' s payoff is 50-
2*25=0. 
If Supplier 1 submits Oh, the ISO calculates procurement cost as 
Min{20+2max{10,40}, 2(40)}=2(40)=80 and Supplier l ' s payoff is 80-
2*25=30. 
Therefore, in equilibrium Supplier 1 offers high, the MCP is $40/MW and 
the actual procurement cost is $80. Notice that this allocation is production 
efficient, since there is no way to serve 2MW cheaper than the chosen supplier 
does. 
In this case, the OCM generates both less efficient allocation and higher 
procurement costs than the PCM. In both auctions Supplier 1 offers high. This 
implies that neither auction can guarantee to eliminate strategic market 
behavior. Supplier 1 could underbid Supplier 2 in the OCM auction to capture 
the whole market, but ij appears that'it is more profitable to sell -less at a high 
price rather tfyan more at a low price, In Section TV, it will be shown that both 
auctions can generate production inefficient outcomes in small and 
concentrated markets. When a competitor for Supplier 1 is added to the market, 
no analog of the discussed case exists. 
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Simple Two-Supplier Auctions 
To see if Example 2 is typical, we adopt Knoblauch's (2005) game 
theoretic approach and investigate the simplest two-supplier auctions. We 
examine games which are identical to Games 1 and 2. 
Consider an electricity market for one hour. The demand is inelastic and 
equal to 2MW. Supplier 1 has zero start-up costs and energy cost Li>0. He can 
supply 0, 1 or 2MW of energy. Supplier 1 can offer low 0\(1)= 0\(2)=L or 
offer high Oh(l)= Oh(2)=H. Supplier 2 has start-up cost S and energy cost 
A>0. She can supply 1MW of energy and always submits her true generation 
cost structure. Supplier l ' s offer has to be at least Li, i.e. Ll<,L<H, otherwise 
Supplier 1 will not cover his generation costs. 
To evaluate production efficiency we need to look at five cost structure 
cases.1 
Casel: S + A<L, (i.e. ATC2 < ATCj) 
This is the case in which Supplier 2 is relatively more efficient than 
Supplier 1. Since LX<,L<H, it follows HiatS + A<L. This is equivalent to 
Case 1 in Knoblauch (2005, section 3). 
Game 3: The OCM Auction 
Oi: min{S+A+L, 2L}=S+A+L 
Oh: min{S+A+H, 2H}=S+A+H 
7C] —L-L] 
K} =H-L] 
Since L-LI<H-LI, Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is S+2H and 
allocation is efficient. 
Game 4; The PCM Auction 
Of. min{S+2max{A,L}, 2L}=2L 
Ok: min{S+2max{A,H}, 2H}=2H 
K}=2(L-LI) 
m=2(H-Li) 
Since 2(L-Li)<2(H-Lj), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is 2H and 
allocation is inefficient. 
The OCM picks 1MW from each supplier, and the PCM picks 2MW from 
Supplier 1. The PCM allocation is not production efficient, since Supplier 2 
could produce electricity cheaper than the chosen Supplier 1 does ( S + A < Ly). 
The OCM allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to produce 
electricity cheaper than the chosen suppliers do (production cost - S + A + I^). 
In the following 4 cases Supplier 1 is relatively more efficient than 
Supplier 2 (i.e. ATCi < ATC2). 
1
 The less likely knife-edge cases such as S+A=L have been omitted. 
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Case2: Ll<S + A<L<H 
Since S + A<L, similarly to Case 1, the OCM picks IMW from each 
supplier and the PCM picks 2MW from Supplier 1. The OCM allocation is not 
production efficient, since Supplier 1 could produce IMW cheaper than the 
chosen Supplier 2 does (L,<S + A). The PCM allocation is production 
efficient, since there is no way to produce electricity cheaper than the chosen 
supplier does (2Z,). Procurement cost is S+2H in the OCM auction and 2H in 
the PCM auction. 
Case3: L, S.L<S + A<H and 2L~H<ll 
Game 3: The OCM Auction 
Or. min{S+A+Lt 2L}=2L XI*=2(L-LI) 
Oh: min{S+A+H, 2HJ=S+A+H ic^H-U 
Since 2(L-LJ)<H-LJ, Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is S+2H and 
allocation is inefficient. 
Game 4: The PCM Auction 
Ot: min{S+2max{A,L}, 2L}=2L 
Oh: min{S+2max{A,HJ, 2H}=2H 
KI=2(L-L,) 
TC^2(H'LJ) 
Since 2(L-Lj)<2(H-Li), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is 2H and 
allocation is efficient. 
The OCM picks IMW from each supplier and the PCM picks 2MW from 
Supplier 1. The OCM allocation is not production efficient, since Supplier 2, 
with relatively higher average total cost, is serving IMW, while Supplier 1, 
with relatively lower average total cost (LI<S+A), is idle. The PCM 
allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to produce electricity 
cheaper than the chosen supplier does (21,). 
Case4: L, zL<S+A<H and 2L-H>Ll 
Game 3: The OCM Auction 
Oi: minfS+A+L, 2L}=2L 7C3~2(L-Li) 
Oh: min{S+A+H, 2H}=S+A+H K^H-LJ 
Since 2(L-Li)>H-Li, Supplier 1 offers low, procurement cost is 2L and 
allocation is efficient. 
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Game 4: The PCM Auction 
0\: min{$+2max{A,L}l 2L}=2L 
Oh: min{S+2max{A,H}, 2H}=2H 
xi=2(L-Ld 
m=2(H-L}) 
Since 2(L-L])<2(H-Li), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is 2H and 
allocation is efficient. 
Both auctions pick 2MW from Supplier 1. Both the OCM allocation and 
the PCM allocation are production efficient, since there is no way to produce 
electricity cheaper than the chosen supplier does (2Z,). 
Case 5: LX<.L<H<S + A 
Since H<S + A, both auctions pick 2MW from Supplier 1. Both the OCM 
allocation and the PCM allocation are production efficient. Procurement cost is 
2H in both auctions. 
The outcomes of the OCM and the PCM auctions are summarized in Table 
4. 
Table 4. The Outcomes of the OCM and the PCM Auctions 
Auction Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Bffici 
cnt $ Efficient $ Efficient $ Efficient $ Efficient S 
OCM S+2H Yes S+2H No S+2H No 2L Yes 2H Yes 
PCM 2H No 2H Yes 2H Yes 2H Yes 2H Yes 
In summary, if we consider Cases 1-5, which were constructed using 
Example 2 as a template, sometimes the PCM is less efficient and sometimes 
the OCM is less efficient. This indicates that in small, concentrated and simple 
markets, neither algorithm could guarantee production efficient allocations if 
strategic behavior takes place. The results hold even if we allow energy price 
offers to be increasing or decreasing step functions of electricity quantity, or if 
we let the strategy sets for energy prices to be continuous. 
In Section V, we show that when another competitor of Supplier 1 type is 
introduced, there are no cases in which the OCM generates less production 
efficient allocations than the PCM. This suggests that in a market with 
completely inelastic demand, an increase in competition will likely lead to an 
advantage of the OCM auction over the PCM auction with respect to 
efficiency. 
An Added Competitor 
To see how competition impacts the efficiency of the OCM and the PCM 
auctions, we extend our analysis from a two supplier market to a wholesale 
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electricity market with three suppliers. An added competitor is identical to 
Supplier 1. We call these twin suppliers without start-up costs Supplier la and 
Supplier lb. We refer to the supplier with start-up costs as Supplier 2. The 
suppliers of type 1 have a continuum of strategies. They can offer energy price 
p $/MW, where p is real. The demand for 2MW is inelastic, however, there is a 
maximum willingness to pay of N $/MW, where N>Li. 
Knoblauch (Proposition 1, 2005) proves that, in the unique Nash 
equilibrium, Supplier la and Supplier lb will submit the offers that reflect their 
true energy generation cost (£[). This result makes our analysis simpler than in 
the two-supplier auctions. 
To evaluate efficiency we need to look at two cost structure cases. 
Case I:S + AKL, (i.e.ATC2<ATCi) 
In this case, Supplier 2 is relatively more efficient than Supplier la and 
Supplier lb. The OCM auction picks IMW from Supplier 2, '/jMW from 
Supplier la and '/4MW from Supplier lb. The PCM auction picks IMW from 
Supplier la and IMW from Supplier lb. The PCM allocation is not production 
efficient, since Supplier 2 could produce IMW cheaper than the chosen 
suppliers do (S + A<Ll). The OCM allocation is production efficient, since 
there is no way to produce electricity cheaper than the chosen suppliers do 
(production cost = S + A + Ly). Procurement cost is S+2Li in the OCM auction 
and 2Li in the PCM auction. 
CaseII: Ll<S + A (i.e.ATC,<ATCJ 
1 
In this case, Suppliers la and lb are relatively more efficient than Supplier 
2. Both auctions pick IMW from Supplier la and IMW from Supplier lb. 
Both allocations are production efficient. Procurement cost is 2Li in both 
auctions. 
In summary, if ATC2<ATCi, then the OCM auction is more efficient; and 
if ATCj<ATC2, then both auctions generate equally efficient allocations of 
contracts. In other words, when Supplier 1 has a competitor, there is no analog 
to Example 2; the OCM auction outperforms the PCM auction with respect to 
efficiency. 
In Case II, both auctions achieve the same procurement cost and 
efficiency. In Case I, the OCM attains a more efficient allocation and the PCM 
produces a lower procurement cost to consumers. This suggests that as 
competition in the market increases, a market designer will likely face a 
tradeoff between two objectives: to minimize procurement cost of electricity or 
to seek production efficient allocations. Up to this point we assumed that 
market demand is given, i.e. perfectly inelastic. This implies that our 
production efficiency analysis is equivalent to the allocative efficiency 
analysis. Therefore, those who use allocative efficiency as a measure for social 
welfare would argue that competitive markets should favor the OCM auction 
over the PCM. We address this issue in more detail in the next section. 
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Can the PCM Outperform the OCM on Allocative Efficiency if Offer 
Prices Reflect True Production Costs? Example 3 
In the previous sections we argued that if strategic behavior takes place 
then both auctions might produce inefficient production allocations. It has been 
shown that an increase in competition will likely lead to an advantage of the 
OCM over the PCM with respect to production efficiency and allocative 
efficiency if the market demand is perfectly inelastic. In the partial equilibrium 
analysis, as opposed to general equilibrium analysis, allocative efficiency is a 
measure of total surplus, a sum of producer and consumer surpluses. 
Sometimes it is used as a proxy for social welfare (Arroyo & Conejo 2002, 
Alonso et al. 1999). Proponents of the OCM see this as a strong argument for 
their case. In this section, we consider demand bids for electricity and 
reexamine the claim that in competitive markets the OCM auction outperforms 
the PCM auction on allocative efficiency. 
This analysis is different from other allocative efficiency investigations of 
auctions because electricity suppliers submit not only energy price offer 
curves, but also start-up costs which are reimbursed to generators if their offers 
are selected. If all suppliers are paid a uniform market clearing price, then the 
funds to pay for their start-up costs must be obtained from consumers by 
charging them a higher price than what generators receive. 
Recall a power system from Example 1 in Section II. The costs and 
characteristics of the four units are summarized in Table 1. Five demand bids 
are summarized in Table 5. Market demand and supply is depicted in Figure 1. 
Table 5. Values and Demand Quantities of Five Consumers 
U 
X 
Y 
Z 
W 
Demand (MW) 
60 
35 
5 
40 
30 
Value (IMW) 
160 
140 
100 
90 
20 
Assume for now that the market is competitive, all generators submit 
offers that reflect their true production costs and all consumers submit bids that 
reflect their true values. Example 1 demonstrated that the OCM auction would 
sell 100MW for $10,020. However, if all consumers are paying a uniform 
price, they would pay at most $10,000 for 100MW. Therefore, the OCM 
auction is able to sell only 95MW for $9,520. So, consumers pay $100.21/MW 
and the average generation cost is S19.68/MW- In this case, the total surplus is 
(160*60+140*35>(10*45+20*45+100*5+20)=$12,630. 
Recall that the PCM auction sells 100MW for $5,000, which is less than 
what consumers are willing to pay. Moreover, the PCM auction sells 140MW 
for $6,200j which is also less than what consumers would pay ($12,600). 
Therefore, the auction allocates 140MW for $44.29/MW. The average 
generation cpst is $34.64/MW. In this case, the total surplus amounts to 
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(160*60+140*35+100*5+90*40)-(10*45+20*45+30*50+2,000)=$13,750. This 
example demonstrates that the PCM can outperform the OCM on allocative 
efficiency even if production prices reflect true production costs. 
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Next we can ask the same question as in Section II: "Do the offer 
strategies to bid true generation costs correspond to Nash equilibria?" 
Assume that market participants have perfect information about electricity 
production costs in the various types of generator units and about electricity 
benefits to consumers. In both auctions, A and B sell their full capacity and 
earn profit since MCP price is higher than their energy cost. They cannot 
benefit from changing their offers. By doing so, they might risk some or all of 
their profits, D is a marginal generator in the PCM allocation and earns no 
economic profit D could offer higher energy cost and still be selected for 
50MW of generation. It is in the interest of D to bid as close as possible to 
$12,600, the amount that consumers are willing to pay for 140MW. If D offers 
S75/MW, the total payment is $12,500 (<$12,600) and its economic profit is 
$2,250. C cannot benefit by changing its offer, sinCe bidding below its costs 
would result in economic loss. On the other hand, C is a marginal generator 
with zero economic profit in the OCM allocation. It is in the interest of Cto bid 
as close as possible to $13,300, the amount that consumers are willing to pay 
for 95MW. If C offers $139/MW, the total payment is $13,225 (<$13;300) and 
C's economic profit is $195. D cannot improve its payoff in this case. 
To sum it up, the OCM contract allocation results in a $139.21/MW final 
price to consumers and a S19.68/MW average generation cost; .the PCM results 
in a $89.29/MW and a S34.64/MW respectively. In this case, switching from 
the OCM to the PCM. auction would lead to an increase of $14.96/MW in 
average production costs and a reduction of $49.92/MW in the consumer price 
of electricity. However, in mis case consumer savings and higher production 
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costs under the PCM auction are not in expense of allocative efficiency. On the 
contrary, the PCM outperforms the OCM on allocative efficiency. 
One could argue that consumers might bid strategically as well. In that 
case, electricity prices might be lower than those discussed above, when only 
suppliers act strategically. However, qualitative results on allocative efficiency 
would persist. 
It is not the intention of this paper to state that the PCM auction would 
always outperform the OCM auction on allocative efficiency if implemented in 
practice. To answer that question, empirical investigation for the specific 
wholesale power market lias to be done. But it is clear from the example that a 
proper algorithm for electricity allocation should take into account the total 
consumer payment and whether consumers are willing to pay that much (e.g. 
Luh et al.*2005b), if indeed market demand has at least some responsiveness to 
electricity price. 
Conclusions 
It has been shown that the proposed payment cost miriimization auction 
can significantly reduce inflated wholesale electricity prices. Critics claim that 
the auction is inefficient and that it would compromise social welfare in a 
competitive market. The goal of this paper was to investigate the efficiency 
performance of the current OCM auction versus the proposed PCM auction. 
The importance of considering strategic behavior in the analysis of 
deregulated electricity1 market was emphasized multiple times. We employed 
game theoretic approach that allowed for strategic behavior by suppliers. An 
example was presented in which, counterintuitively, the • OCM auction 
generated less production efficient allocation of contracts than the PCM 
auction. It was shown that neither formulation can guarantee production 
efficient outcomes in small and concentrated markets. Next, we showed that as 
competition increases, the production efficiency performance of the current 
mechanism versus the proposed auction improves. The results suggest that a 
market designer might face a tradeoff between lower procurement cost of 
electricity and production efficiency. Advice for market supervisors would be 
to keep a sharp eye on the marginal generators if market behavior becomes a 
concern. Finally, it was demonstrated that the PCM auction can outperform the 
OCM auction on allocative efficiency even if offers reflect true generation 
costs. If indeed market demand is not perfectly inelastic, an allocation 
algorithm that maximizes total surplus should account for the total consumer 
payment and check whether consumers are willing to pay that much. It is 
important to remember that the use of allocative efficiency as a measure for 
social welfare is limited to partial equilibrium analysis as opposed to general 
equilibrium analysis. 
It should be noted that the total value of energy dispatched in these 
systems is tens of billions of dollars annually. Even a small change in the 
efficiency of market clearing algorithm is worth tens of millions of dollars. 
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Further empirical research should be done to evaluate potential gains from 
switching to the new auction in the markets that are considering a change. It 
was not the purpose of this paper to quantify the gains, •but rather to highlight 
the efficiency enhancing potential of the PCM auction. 
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